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1 Introduction
The New Delhi statement ‘Some for All’,
following the Global Consultation on Safe Water
and Sanitation (United Nations 1990: 4), noted
the importance of people and institutions in its
second principle, ‘a changing role of government
is envisaged from that of provider to promoter
and facilitator. This will enable local public,
private and community institutions to deliver
better services’. The Dublin Statement (United
Nations 1992: 1), two years later, underscored
this by declaring in its second principle, that
‘water development and management should be
based on a participatory approach involving
users, planners and policy makers at all levels’.
These principles are reflected in two trends
which exemplify recent research and thinking in
service delivery, including the provision of water
in developing countries. First, there is greater
attention being paid to non-state, or private
providers, particularly small-scale informal
private providers (Bakker 2008; Rose 2006;
Batley 2006). In the water sector, such providers
have been variously labelled as small-scale water
sellers, informal operators, small water
enterprises, water vendors and resellers
(Collignon and Vézina 2000; Sansom 2006; van
Dijk 2008; McGranahan and Owen 2006). There
is now a large and growing literature on the
characteristics of such providers, and a lively
debate about the need for incorporating them
into public provision regimes in order to improve
access and quality of drinking water for the poor.1
As part of this, there is also increasing interest in
informal piped network providers due to their
ability to invest, develop viable business models
and scale-up operations (Conan 2005).
Second, and in parallel, there is a move towards
looking beyond the technical aspects of service
provision to the role of politics (Batley 2004). In
the water sector, the shift is from issues of water
provision, regulation, tariffs and quality, to the
more political and governance aspects of
provision, including policy influence through
political participation, claim making and
accountability (Chaplin 2011; Castro 2004). As
the broader literature on service delivery points
out, failures of provision are often the result of
governance problems, such as accountability
failures, rather than of technical or resource-
related issues (World Bank 2004).
27
Pipe Dreams? The Governance of
Urban Water Supply in Informal
Settlements, New Delhi
Suneetha Dasappa Kacker and Anuradha Joshi*
Abstract This article explores two trends which exemplify recent research and thinking in service delivery:
first, understanding the role of small-scale informal providers and second, understanding the politics and
governance of service provision. Drawing on field research on urban water in New Delhi, we show that
while informal providers fill a gap left by the public utility, residents are captive consumers with limited
ability to influence service quality or price. However, this low service level trap can be shifted; and the very
seeds of change seem to lie in the evolving relationships between informal providers, residents of informal
settlements, politicians and the water utility. The case highlights two factors that enabled the transition:
(1) the nature of the service, particularly piped water systems, are more conducive to triggering collective
action; and (2) rising political awareness and competition can enable community groups to break out of
clientelistic relationships with local politicians.
IDS Bulletin Volume 43  Number 2  March 2012   © 2012 The Authors. IDS Bulletin © 2012 Institute of Development Studies
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
Yet, there is little research that links these two
trends, i.e. work on politics and governance
issues underpinning the operations of small-scale
informal private piped water providers. This
article, drawing on exploratory field research in
a large informal settlement at the urban fringe
of New Delhi, attempts to fill this gap. Informal
private providers are ubiquitous in such
settlements and offer a service in the context of
the absence of the state. Yet such provision is
often problematic, as providers, out to recoup
costs and generate profits rapidly (due to the
high risks involved), exploit captive users and
offer substandard service. One can characterise
the starting situation as a vicious cycle of
relationships between residents, informal piped
network providers, politicians and the water
authority, that traps communities into a
situation of poor access and quality of service.
The question then is: how can the vicious cycle
be converted into a virtuous one, in which
informal private water providers are legalised
and regulated by the state to provide safe and
affordable water at a desired level of service?
In-keeping with findings elsewhere, the research
shows that while informal private providers fill a
gap left by the formal public utility due to limited
resources, capacity and the insecure tenure of the
settlements, residents are often captive
consumers with limited ability to influence
service quality or price. However, the evolving
trajectory of relationships between these
stakeholders in the case examined here, suggests
that the pathway to change may lie in the
dynamics of how the relationships themselves
evolve. While the particular processes through
which this happens in this case are unique, they
point to some key factors that can enable such a
transition. We argue that two factors matter: (1)
the nature of the service, in that certain forms of
provision by small-scale independent providers,
particularly piped water systems, are more
conducive to triggering collective action, claim-
making and accountability demands on public
utilities for better services; and (2) rising political
awareness and competition, which can enable
community groups to break out of clientelistic
relationships with local politicians and facilitate
direct engagement with public utilities.
This article is organised into seven sections. The
section following this introduction explores the
manner in which urban politics influences the
delivery of basic services, and the operations of
non-state providers. The next three sections
present the case material. This is analysed in
section 6, highlighting two factors that are key in
moving towards more accountable relationships
with the utilities and local politicians. We
conclude with some observations.
2 Non-state providers and collective action
In many cities, the poor access services in low-
income settlements through the local political
process (Coelho et al. 2011; Cross 1988). Often
such relationships feature patronage or
clientelistic politics, in which local politicians
offer quasi-legal settlements incremental
improvements in services, in return for electoral
support. Although this is changing in some cities
as institutions for direct participation of citizens
in governance are developed (e.g. governance
councils in Brazil or the Bhagidari programme in
Delhi), by and large, the route for accessing
services for the poor remains through political
channels. Yet, very few studies explicitly examine
how residents of low-income settlements engage
with the political system to make claims on the
state around water. Jha et al. (2007) highlight the
role of local intermediaries – pradhans – in linking
residents with elected politicians, aggregating
demands and delivering support. Such local
intermediaries and politicians have few
incentives to provide the level of public services
that residents desire – and are often willing to
pay for – as that would weaken the hold they
exert on such populations.
Coupled with this, service utilities in most
developing countries have limited resources,
capacity or interest in providing services to
settlements that are often on precarious ground,
both geographically and legally. As a result, such
settlements are often served by informal non-
state water providers which operate on the
margins of the law (Schaub-Jones 2008; Conan
2005; Kariuki and Schwartz 2005). As Schaub-
Jones (2008) shows, these non-state small-scale
providers are filling a gap where public water
utilities have failed: they invest significant
amounts in developing alternative systems
despite the challenges; they are innovative both
technically and operationally; and the potential
pool of such entrepreneurs may be larger than
many believe. Yet often, these informal providers
offer services at high prices and uncertain
quality. Consequently, several observers have
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called for greater engagement with such small-
scale providers as a means to overcome the
limitations of the utility-led model for extending
water services for poor and underserved areas;
and improving service levels offered by informal
providers (WSP 2009; Schaub-Jones 2008;
Sansom 2006; Njiru and Albu 2004). The desired
scenario is one in which small-scale water
providers carry out their operations under the
scrutiny of the state, and consumers have access
to high-quality services at reasonable prices, with
strong grievance redressal systems built in.
However, the existing alignment of various
stakeholders is not naturally conducive to
delivering the desired change. Local politicians
and leaders have few incentives to extend full
services – either through utilities or non-state
providers – to informal settlements. In fact, they
often have significant financial stakes in the
running of informal provision, either through
direct ownership or through close family,
financial or political ties. Public utilities are
themselves overstretched and under-resourced;
and dealing with informal settlements is seen as
messy and ‘unprofessional’. Finally, citizens, on
their part, are trapped into unsatisfactory
relationships with providers due to the lack of
alternatives and, more importantly, the problems
of collective action. Indeed, often the
intermediaries and politicians are the ones who
head neighbourhood associations. The case study
reported below suggests a potential pathway for
moving out of this impasse.
3 The context
In India, urban water supply is managed by
public utilities. Most utilities are unable to
provide water at adequate levels of service to the
whole population. Over the years, there has been
under-investment in infrastructure and poor
management of existing assets and water
resources, leading to acute water problems in
many cities (Caseley 2003; Tata Consulting
Services 2003). The poor bear the brunt of
inadequate services, particularly as their
ambiguous tenure status acts as a further
disincentive for public utilities to extend services
to areas inhabited by them. Under pressure,
urban local governments sometimes provide
water tankers or standpipes in illegal
settlements; however, these offer erratic supply
and are inadequate to meet demand. As a result,
thousands of urban dwellers living in slums and
illegal settlements get water from  informal
providers – water vendors or piped water
suppliers (Angueletou-Marteau 2007; Llorente
and Zerah 2003).
The government’s approach to the issue of basic
services in illegal settlements has tended to be
determined by political expediency. Despite
residents’ continuous efforts, unauthorised
settlements have been regularised in Delhi only
twice: once in 1961, and again in 1977. Demands
have been raised, and promises made at every
election since, but with no long-term sustainable
outcome. The provision of services by public
utilities in such settlements had been restricted
by the High Court, due to their ambiguous legal
status. However, a series of rulings in 1994, 1998
and 2004, permitted the provision of electricity
and water supply; roads and drains; and
sewerage facilities, respectively, to these
settlements, in order to improve degraded living
conditions. In spite of this, implementation has
been piecemeal and sluggish, as utilities have
been reluctant to act, should such action be
interpreted as an indication of de facto
legalisation. Moreover, there is reluctance to
invest in an area whose configuration in the long
term is unclear. As a result, initiatives have been
sporadic and politically driven.2
After continuous pressure from collective actors,
citizen groups, the courts and the media, the
government finally notified guidelines for the
regularisation of such illegal settlements in 2008.
The guidelines elaborate a number of steps that
residents and public entities are to undertake, in
order to legalise any settlement.3 Only after such
steps are undertaken and approved, may an area
be taken over by the public utility for provision of
infrastructure in a planned and comprehensive
manner.
Sangam Vihar is one such ‘unauthorised’
settlement at the southern periphery of Delhi,
that could potentially access services, including
water, through a process of regularlisation.4 It
currently houses an estimated 0.4–0.6 million
inhabitants, and has existed for over 30 years
(Dasgupta and Puri 2005). The present residents
consist largely of low and low–middle-income
households, comprising petty vendors, unskilled
workers, small service providers, domestic help
and low-level public sector employees. Yet, as we
will see, the process of gaining access to services
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has been a complex one, involving collective
action, petitioning of the water utility and
appealing to local elected political
representatives. Over the period spanning mid-
2007 to early 2008, we researched the trajectory
of potable water in Sangam Vihar. The
methodology followed was one of structured
interviews, with both residents of Sangam Vihar
and private providers. Although a format for the
questionnaire was developed, the actual
conversations were much broader, and covered
several issues, inextricably linked with the
provision of water services. In all, eight key
residents were interviewed. Interviews with
private providers were difficult to elicit, due to
the perceived nature of their activities – four
were interviewed. Most of the interactions, with
both residents and providers, occurred in blocks
B and D of the sprawling settlement. In addition,
in both areas, members of the Residents’ Welfare
Associations (RWAs), mostly formed around
issues of water and physical consolidation, were
rich and valuable sources of information.
4 Non-state providers of piped water, Sangam
Vihar
Because it is considered an ‘unauthorised’
settlement, the Delhi Jal Board (DJB, the public
water utility) does not provide Sangam Vihar
with a piped water supply. In the early years of its
formation, the area was supplied through public
hand pumps. Residents reported being satisfied
with this arrangement, until increasing usage
caused a lowering of groundwater levels, and
water discharge from the hand pumps became
erratic and unreliable. In response to this, a few
households established private borewells. While
these initially served only the households’ needs,
the owners soon started supplying water to
neighbouring residents and households in the
vicinity for a small payment. By 1985, seizing a
clear opportunity, these entrepreneurs had
established and extended borewell-based local
piped water networks to service neighbourhoods/
households on a commercial basis.
To understand the political aspects, it is
important to understand some technical aspects
of the system. On average, a system consisting of
a borewell, a pump and a distribution network of
pipes may serve 150–200 households. Some,
however, are larger and may cover up to 500
households. Entrepreneurs themselves are rarely
involved in the day-to-day operation: they engage
operators to run the systems. Water is pumped
directly from the ground, into main distribution
lines, which further branch out into secondary
and branch lines laid through the streets being
served. The operator manipulates a series of
valves on each line to direct the water into a
specific branch line. After households on the
concerned branch line have drawn water, valves
are adjusted to divert the water to the next line,
and so forth until all the lines have been
supplied. While the entrepreneur invests in
establishing the system, households are
responsible for establishing the connection from
the branch line to their plot. The cost of this may
vary, depending upon the distance of the plot
from the nearest branch line. In addition to
bearing the cost of connection, the households
must also pay a one-time connection charge, and
a fixed monthly fee for the water consumed.
Typically, the cost of connection averages US$30,
but may be as high as US$70, when the distance to
the providers’ pipeline is substantial. The
connection charge was US$20 at the time, and the
monthly fee varied from US$6–10.5 This seemed
loosely related to consumption – most houses filled
a 500 litre capacity overhead tank, and households
with larger tanks, or tenants, were charged more.
All the operators interviewed claimed there was a
‘special consideration’ to poorer households. In
contrast, the average monthly bill of a typical
middle-income household being supplied by the
public utility, averages US$6–8.
Of significance is that the geographic area of
operation is not exclusive to any one
entrepreneur. More than one entrepreneur often
establish main, secondary and branch lines
through the same streets. Thus, in theory,
households may exercise a choice among
operators, at least at the initial stage. Once
connected, however, the options for change
become limited, due to the expense incurred in
changing the household connection from one
operator’s line to another. Thus, in practice,
hardly any households change their service
providers while they are in operation.6
These arrangements for distribution of water do
not have formal recognition or legal sanction.
There is no monitoring by the utility, or licensing
arrangement to ensure quality of water, level of
service and terms of operation. In effect, the
operations are deemed illegal, and consequently,
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are under continuous risk of being detected and
terminated. Typically, the entrepreneurs
establishing the systems are well linked to local
politicians or influential residents – alleviating the
risk, to a certain extent.7 This has a significant
impact on the investments incurred and the
nature and level of service that is provided.
Because of the risks, the operator’s key interest
is to recover the costs of establishment in the
shortest period of time. Since households pay on
a monthly basis, rather than on the basis of
water consumption, the attempt is to increase
the customer base, and hence revenues, in order
to achieve this.8 The system, however, has a
limited capacity to deliver; water must be made
available in each branch line for a minimum
period each day, so that households have
sufficient time to fill their ground level storage
units.9 Increasing the customer base by adding a
small branch line, or connecting more
households to an existing branch line, reduces
the amount of time that each household has to
draw upon the water. As a result, households that
had access to water for a few hours each day
when they were initially connected to a network,
reported being able to draw water for barely
15–20 minutes in a day as the operator increased
the number of households being supplied.
Furthermore, the supply of water to branch lines
could be reduced to alternate days, in order to
accommodate larger numbers of households.
The increase in the number of connections
implies longer operating and pumping hours – at
times, pumps are operated for up to 18 hours a
day in order to supply all households. Despite
this, systems are manned by single operators,
and none reported having a standby pump. It is
not infrequent for pumps to overheat and
malfunction, especially during the hot summer
months. This was reported to occur almost 3–4
times every summer, disrupting supply for up to
three days. Additionally, long hours of operation,
coupled with unpredictable electricity outages in
the area, with no provision for standby electricity,
make it difficult to establish a reliable timetable
for supply. As a result, water is made available to
households at erratic timings: as one resident
put it, ‘at any time of day or night’.10
The need to maximise revenues in the shortest
period of time also leads to charges being
increased suddenly, or connections being cut
arbitrarily. If a new household is willing to bear
higher charges, an existing connection may be
discontinued suddenly, in order to accommodate
the new connection.11 Since all operators in the
area follow similar practices regarding supply
and billing, residents have few alternatives.
5 Petitioning for a public water supply
Erratic service, steep charges and the increasing
lack of response, over time, to households’
concerns on the part of private operators led to
the formation of resident groups in Sangam Vihar
to actively petition for public provision of water,
since 2001.12 This petitioning was fuelled by a
growing public perception that water supply was
the government’s responsibility and that citizens
have a right to a drinking water supply. Implicit in
this was the assumption that public provision
should be subsidised or provided at a lower cost
than that presently available through the private
providers. As one resident put it, ‘if so many
families are settled here, how can government not
provide water for them?’13 Yet, numerous efforts to
plead with the DJB proved futile.14 As one resident
put it ‘joote poore ghis jayenge, par milega kuch nahin’
(‘the soles of our shoes will wear out, but we will
get nothing’).15 Moreover, while the RWAs were
aware that the DJB, as the water utility, was
responsible for providing them with water, they
did not know the processes to be followed to
legally procure a supply.16
Discouraged by the lack of response from the
DJB, in 2006 the resident groups approached the
areas elected representatives:  Members of the
(State) Legislative Assembly (MLAs). By now,
there was a perception that public services could
be procured through the MLA. The two MLAs
approached, both of whom were from opposition
political parties at the time, supported the
groups and followed-up by writing to the DJB
and leading protests and demonstrations to the
DJB offices. This activity met with some success:
the first tubewell was established in 2006 and
three more were established in 2007. The capital
costs for the wells were met by the MLA’s area
development funds and the electricity connection
was paid for by the public utility. Public
standpoints were provided at the wells, but no
further work to enable household connectivity
was undertaken.
However, residents were unhappy with having to
access water from a public standpoint – having
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become used to piped household supply, despite
the poor service levels. Consequently, resident
groups collectively undertook the work of
planning and implementing a distribution
system from the public standpoint enabling each
household to connect individually to the piped
system. Money was collected to pay for the
distribution lines, while individual household
connections were the household’s responsibility.17
The RWA organised the operation and
maintenance of the system, typically in the same
manner as the private providers. Local youth are
employed to open valves and inform households
of the availability of water in their lines.
Residents report greater satisfaction with this
arrangement, as there is an agreed-to schedule
for supply, and costs are not increased arbitrarily
since the collective works as a cooperative. A
monthly contribution of US$1 is collected by the
RWA from each beneficiary household, to cover
operations and maintenance costs for the pump
operator, and minor repairs to the network
pipes.18
At least one private operator, among those
interviewed, reported having been put out of
business by the establishment of a public
tubewell resulting from the residents’ collective
action. RWAs confirmed that private operators
had initially been sceptical that their demands
would be heeded to – and had had little interest
in negotiating with residents to improve services
to avoid being made redundant. Existing private
providers thus have no role in the new
arrangements, and their political patrons –
belonging to the ruling dispensation in the state
– also stand sidelined.
While both the DJB and the area MLA are well
aware of these activities of extending and
managing piped networks by the RWAs, they
turn a blind eye to them. The operations of this
system are entirely ‘unofficial’ and the DJB has
made it clear that its involvement terminates at
the establishment of the deep borewell: it will
entertain no requests or complaints related to
the system thereafter. This is because the
extension of full water supply services to Sangam
Vihar by the DJB is contingent upon its
regularisation through the process indicated in
the guidelines notified in 2008.19
The arrangement that the RWAs are putting in
place – tubewells installed by DJB and
distribution lines operated and maintained by its
own staff – could potentially lead to greater
independence from local political representatives,
provided that it is recognised and accepted by the
DJB. This is not yet the case however, leaving the
window open for politicians to intervene. Any
illegal operation is in the local politician’s
interest, who will be unwilling to allow a change
towards a more transparent and formal regime
that will effectively reduce his influence.
Officials within the DJB are well aware that
current arrangements are similar to the ones
under the private operators. But where the
private operators were recouping costs and
reaping profits by charging high rates, the
current actual costs of operating the system are
not being reflected in the charges levied by the
resident groups. The utility receives no payments
under the present arrangements. Moreover, the
utility bears the costs of electricity for the
tubewells. One view was that the arrangement
could be made more sustainable in the long
term, if residents were to meet the cost of the
service, including electricity, maintenance and
manpower, under a system operator selected and
overseen by the DJB.20 The dilemma faced,
however, is how to ensure that the process of
selection is fair and transparent – and not
captured by vested interests.
Should the DJB agree to the option of private
provision, entailing no investment from its side,
and agree to play a critical (but minimal)
regulatory role, the provision of piped water
supply can be de-linked from the settlement’s
status, particularly as the process of
regularisation is likely to be long drawn out. The
agreement with the private operator could be
drawn up for a limited number of years, and
expressly de-linked from any rights of
occupation.21
6 Enabling factors
The trajectory presented above suggests a
potential path through which the poor quality
service trap faced by residents could be
transformed, resulting in better services, a
responsive DJB and potential regulation of
private providers. While widespread discontent
with the services of private providers was the key
motivating factor in this shift, we argue that user
mobilisation was greatly facilitated by two
specific factors, outlined below.
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6.1 Nature of service
Informal piped networks, we argue, offer greater
potential for collective action. Unlike public
standpipes or informal water vendors, piped
networks enable relatively clear boundaries of
user households associated with particular piped
systems (or even branches of systems in the case
of large systems).22 Such a natural clarification of
boundaries of beneficiaries supports collective
action because the physical configuration
encourages small groups in which free-riding is
prevented by the nature of service itself (Olsen
1971). These groups are bound by a shared sense
of outrage and dissatisfaction with inadequate
water supply.
Moreover, piped water systems require
substantial investments by the households prior
to accessing water. Thus, households acquire a
stake in the system operations, creating
incentives to demand formalisation; or
alignment with and provisioning through a
formal recognised system of delivery. Within the
existing operations, households also felt a right
to demand (and be provided) adequate levels of
service, by virtue of bearing the cost of service.
Payments introduce the right to accountability.
This is unlike services derived from water
vendors, where investments are not (directly)
made by households – the stakes are much lower,
and erratic or poor services may not generate the
motivational force for mobilisation and claim
making.
6.2 Political awareness and competition
The collective action enabled by the nature of
piped systems was enhanced by increased
political awareness among residents. The profile
of residents subscribing to piped water services is
also a factor: most of these households are not at
the bottom of the ladder, but very much in the
process of consolidating their status and habitat
in the city.23 Their expectations of convenience in
service delivery are not low, all the more so
having experienced household access through
the informal providers. In addition, greater
penetration of the media has made residents
aware of the larger political changes in the
country, including the move towards rights-based
approaches. They have become aware of their
rights, and of the responsibility of public utilities
to meet their needs. This provides legitimacy
and conviction to their demands, as well as the
process of petitioning.
Political competition at the local level has
supported these shifts. The private providers in
Sangam Vihar are politically well linked. The
local politician in power has a stake in the
business of the private operator, and is unlikely
to favour any arrangement that disturbs this.
Only with the rise of political competition at the
local level were resident groups able to use
political influence to reach the public utility, as
opposition leaders have few vested interests in
existing arrangements and high incentives to
break incumbent political bases.
However, the extent of success that was achieved
in Sangam Vihar was limited to the
establishment of public tubewells – which
entailed access to supply within the established
framework. Household level connectivity was
extended entirely through the efforts of the
RWA. Effectively, claim-making did not lead to
longer-term institutional reforms to facilitate
provision of water at the household level. And in
fact, current arrangements have a limited
possibility of meeting the needs of the large
population, as groundwater supply throughout
the city is under threat.
7 Conclusions
Observers of this case might view it as one in
which private providers offer poor water access
and quality, and profiteer in collusion with local
politicians at the expense of the poor. We
suggest, however, that the very existence of such
providers creates a potential pathway through
which residents can access public services in the
long term. Through a gradual shift in the
incentives all stakeholders face – residents,
providers, politicians and the water utility –
there is an opportunity to shift the low-level
equilibrium towards better engagement,
regulation and service provision.
Not all contexts lend themselves to such a shift.
This case suggests that piped water systems,
combined with political awareness and
competition, are more likely to enable residents
to tip the balance towards more accountable,
responsive systems. Key steps in this process
involve (a) heightening resident’s stakes in a
formal system, by virtue of the investment
required by the household; (b) generating
demand for accountability through levy of user
charges; (c) the formation of geographically well-
defined groups of households with a shared sense
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of dissatisfaction and purpose; (d) rising resident
awareness of rights, and expectations of service
delivery through public utilities; and (e) political
competition leading to a break with past
patronage relationships. Through such a process,
informal provisioning may well represent an
effective stepping stone to fully fledged, formal
provision of services by public utilities.
The research shows how initial attempts of
residents to break out of the dependence on
informal providers and gain direct access to the
public water supply provided by the water utility
were not successful. Later, when residents
approached local elected politicians who used
their influence and budgetary resources, they
had limited success with the utility extending
standpipes to the settlement. However, as we
show, the price for such political mediation is the
establishment of a patron–client relationship
between politicians and residents. In both
situations, residents have limited abilities to hold
the informal provider or the local politician
accountable. Establishing a more direct
relationship of entitlement between residents
and the water utility by legalising and regulating
informal providers and incorporating them into
public systems, could be a more promising way of
both ensuring sustainability of water provision,
and improving the governance of urban water
services.
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* The research reported here was partly
supported by the DFID-funded Centre for the
Future State at IDS. We are grateful for
comments by participants at the Liquid
Dynamics II Symposium held at IDS,
21–23 March 2011 and an anonymous reviewer.
1 It is well recognised that small-scale private
providers have the background, social skills,
flexibility and ability to customise operations
in order to effectively service the particular
and varied needs of the poor (Schaub-Jones
2008).
2 Noting the situation, the Delhi High Court, as
well as the Supreme Court of India, have
repeatedly directed the state to develop a
policy for regularisation of illegal settlements,
going so far as to record that ‘the result of not
taking decision is resulting in corruption (i.e.
rent seeking) at various levels’. CWP
No 4771/1993 entitled: Common Cause (Regd.)
Society vs Union of India.
3 Including drawing up a plan of the area;
earmarking plots for the provision of facilities
and payment of development charges.
4 Such ‘unauthorised’ settlements are illegal
because land was subdivided and sold without
the requisite planning permissions.
5 Using an average rate of US$1 = INR 50.
6 It is not uncommon for borewells to run dry.
In this situation, households are reimbursed
the connection charge and have no option but
to change service providers.
7 For example, the original owners of the land,
many of whom still reside in Sangam Vihar
and may have been directly involved in the
subdivision and sale of the land.
8 Installing meters to monitor usage would be
perceived as an additional, unnecessary cost.
As is described later, water consumption is
limited through other strategies.
9 In order to ensure that pressure is sufficient,
households are provided with water in a
staggered or sequential manner. Most
households will use pumps to draw water into
their storage unit. A few depend on gravity
flow. Storage units typically have a capacity of
500 litres.
10 Personal interview, resident; D-Block, Sangam
Vihar, August 2007.
11 There is often a marked variation in charges
for the same level of service.
12 While resident groups may take up other issues,
the main purpose for their formation was stated
to be to petition for water. Groups are commonly
formed around streets or ‘gullies’, but may
include several streets to encompass a locality.
13 Personal interview, General Secretary, B-Block
RWA, Sangam Vihar, November 2007.
14 The elected ward councillors (representatives
to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi) were
similarly ineffective.
15 Personal interview, President, Shri Ganesh
Welfare Society, D-Block, Sangam Vihar,
December 2007.
16 For example, the DJB was unwilling to make
any provisions until the area’s electricity
supply was formalised. This was achieved in
2005, again as a result of the RWA’s efforts.
17 Typically, each household’s contribution was
US$30 (US$1 = INR 50).
18 This is a fraction of the monthly charge
(US$6–10), which was earlier being paid to
private operators.
19 The process itself is being taken forward very
slowly, and the feasibility of achieving the
objective is not very clear.
20 Personal interview, DJB official, February 2010.
21 This approach has been adopted successfully
in the Slum Networking Programme in
Ahmedabad, India. Land-owning agencies
have provided ‘No Objection Certificates’
(NoCs) to settlements on their sites for
limited periods of time, in order to enable the
provision of services to the inhabitants in the
interim. The NoCs confer no rights to the
residents with respect to the land, but
facilitate financing of infrastructure in an
environment of relative, although limited,
security.
22 The importance of technology and network
effects of piped systems on governance and
collective action has been noted by others (e.g.
Watson 1995; Joshi and Moore 1997).
23 However, some households were well below
the poverty line.
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